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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Cody Marlow appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief contending he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether
his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that the plea agreement contained a waiver of
his right to appeal.
Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
In May 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 2591
(1970), Marlow pled guilty to second degree kidnapping and robbery. (Aug. R., pp.1-2. 1) The
district court further explained:
Marlow had agreed to “waive appeal as of right as to conviction and ability to
request a withdrawal of guilty plea under I.C.R. 34." The state had agreed to
dismiss another second degree kidnapping charge, another robbery charge, a grand
theft charge, an aggravated assault charge, and a persistent violator enhancement.
Before Marlow pled guilty, he had been acquitted of one of two aggravated
assault charges pursuant to a jury trial that began on March 27, 2020 and ended the
next day, but the jury was unable to come to a determination as to the remaining
charges. After he pled guilty, Marlow moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to
dismiss. The District Court denied those motions, and subsequently sentenced
Marlow to a unified term of 20 years imprisonment, with eight years fixed and 12
years indeterminate. On March 25, 2019 Marlow filed a notice of appeal. . . . On
November 18, 2019, Marlow moved to dismiss his appeal, and that motion was
granted.
(Aug. R., p.2.)
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On March 25, 2021, this Court issued an order granting Marlow’s motion to augment the
appellate record with the district court’s Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Disposition. That document will be cited as “Aug. R.”)
1

Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
On March 30, 2020, Marlow filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.613), and the state responded with an Answer (R., pp.20-22). Marlow, through newly-appointed
conflict counsel, filed an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and supporting affidavit
(R., pp.48-61). In his Amended Petition, Marlow claimed, inter alia, that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to advise him that the plea agreement required Marlow to waive his right to
appeal his conviction. (R., pp.50-51.) The state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (R.,
pp.62-72), Marlow filed a Response (R., pp.209-226), and the state filed a Reply (R., pp.227-236).
A hearing was held on the state’s motion (see generally 10/8/20 Tr.), and on November 5, 2020,
the district court entered an order granting the state’s motion (Aug. R., pp.3-38), followed by a
Judgment dismissing the petition with prejudice (R., pp.237-238). Marlow timely appealed. (R.,
pp.239-242.)

2

ISSUE
Marlow states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the claim that defense
counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to advise Mr. Marlow
that the plea agreement contained a waiver of the right to appeal?
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Marlow failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
claim that this trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that the plea agreement
required him to waive his right to appeal his conviction?
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ARGUMENT
Marlow Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Him That The Plea
Agreement Required Him To Waive His Right To Appeal His Conviction
A.

Introduction
Marlow argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that his trial

counsel’s performance was ineffective because he failed to advise Marlow that the Pretrial
Settlement Offer (“Offer” (attached as Appendix A)) required him to waive his right to appeal
from his conviction. (See generally Appellant’s brief, pp.2-16.)
Contrary to Marlow’s argument, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing his
post-conviction claim because (1) any claim of prejudice relating to counsel’s performance is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) Marlow failed to support his claim of prejudice with
evidence that rejection of the Offer would have been rational under the circumstances, and (3)
Marlow failed to support his claim of prejudice because he failed to present evidence that he lacked
knowledge of the appeal waiver provision and the record of the underlying criminal case disproves
this claim.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s application of the

Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,
968 (2001). On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court
reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho
801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755
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(Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
C.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil
proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant “has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738,
739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction application
are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v.
State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima
facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further,
allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they are
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law.
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Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d
870, 873 (2007).
D.

Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate

both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Under Strickland,
a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,
110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in relation to a guilty plea, “in order
to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). As
more recently stated in Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 744 (2019) (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000)) (emphasis added), “prejudice is presumed ‘when counsel’s
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would
have taken.’” “Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480).
6

E.

Relevant Background
1. Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea Proceeding
After pleading guilty to second degree kidnapping and robbery, Marlow filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. (Aug. R., p.4.) At a hearing on that motion, when asked about waiving
his right to move to withdraw his guilty pleas, Marlow testified,
I have a hard time reading without glasses, and I was not aware that I was not able
to appeal it or withdraw my guilty plea or else I would not have signed the deal. I
found out by my attorney afterwards.[2]
(R. p.158 (2/15/19 Tr., p. 76, Ls.4-8).)
At the hearing on Marlow’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, his attorney argued, “my
client made – stated today that he was – didn’t have his reading glasses and was unable to read the
plea agreement. He has the right, at this Court’s discretion, to withdraw his guilty plea before
sentencing.” (R., p.166 (2/15/19 Tr., p.84, Ls.5-9).) In denying Marlow’s motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, the district court initially explained that the Offer was signed by both counsel and
Marlow, and “the defendant's agreement to check box is checked, and it says, "Waive appeal as of
right as to conviction and ability to request a withdrawal of guilty plea under Idaho Criminal Rule
34[.]" (R., p.171-72 (2/15/19 Tr., p.89, L.21 – p.90, L.15) (emphasis added).) After reciting all
the provisions of the Offer, the court held:
When one looks at the pretrial settlement offer that was signed by everybody back
on May 18th and looks at the record that was made when the plea was entered, the
Court finds that there was a knowing and voluntarily and intelligently-entered
guilty plea, so the Court accepted the plea, ordered the presentence investigation
and set the case for sentencing.

2

The Offer sheet sets forth Defendant’s agreement to “Waive appeal as of right as to conviction
and ability to request a withdrawal of guilty plea under I.C.R. 34.” (R., p.78.) That provision
appears prominently in the middle of the Offer sheet with a checked box in front of it. (Id.)
Marlow signed the offer sheet accepting the plea agreement. (Id.)
7

(R., p.172 (2/15/19 Tr., p.90, Ls.16-22 (emphasis added).)
By first explaining that the Offer included an appeal waiver provision, then concluding
that, “[w]hen one looks at the [Offer] . . . , the Court finds that there was a knowing and voluntarily
and intelligently-entered guilty plea,” the court factored that provision into its finding. (Id.) In
short, the court held – despite Marlow’s claim that he was unaware of the Offer’s appeal waiver
provision – that his pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
The trial court also opined on Marlow’s parallel claim that he did not understand that the
Offer required him – in the same sentence as his appeal waiver – to waive his right to move to
withdraw his guilty plea. The court reiterated its finding that Marlow’s guilty pleas were entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, stating:
Interestingly, Mr. Marlow indicated that he did not understand that by
accepting this pretrial settlement offer and allowing the charges to be dismissed in
connection with that that he was giving up his ability to withdraw his guilty plea.
It's written in plain English. It's not a very complicated plea agreement. I don't find
that Mr. Marlow has carried his burden to establish that there is a just reason
existing to withdraw this plea. I find that he also waived his right to do so when he
accepted the pretrial settlement offer.
Had the plea not been knowingly or voluntarily or intelligently entered, we
would have a different question here, but it was, and that was part of the bargain,
so I am going to deny the motion to allow the withdrawal of the guilty plea.
(R., p.174-75 (2/15/19 Tr., p.92, L.21 – p.93, L.11) (emphasis added).)
Marlow appealed from his convictions, and in his opening brief, he alleged “the district
court erred when it (1) denied his motion to dismiss the case and (2) denied his motion to withdraw
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his guilty plea.” (46922 Mot. to Dismiss Appeal, p.2, attached as Appendix B. 3) The state filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, quoting McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 296, 396 P.3d 1168, 1178
(2017), which held that once a defendant who has waived the right to appeal files an appeal, and
the waiver is brought to the appellate Court’s attention before oral argument, the Court will “issue
an order conditionally dismissing the appeal in order to give the defendant an opportunity to show
good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.” (46922 Mot. to Dismiss Appeal, filed Nov.
18, 2019, pp.1-2 (explanations in Motion to Dismiss Appeal), Appendix B.) Marlow’s direct
appeal counsel responded to the state’s motion by filing a letter with the Clerk of Court
acknowledging that the state had invoked the appeal waiver provision, and said, “I do not intend
to file any further response to the Motion to Dismiss Appeal in this case.” (46922 Letter to Clerk
of Court, dated Dec. 2, 2019, attached as Appendix C.) The Idaho Supreme Court subsequently
entered an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, noting that “[a] LETTER was filed by counsel for
Appellant on December 2, 2019[,]” and stating that, “after due consideration,” the state’s Motion
to Dismiss Appeal is granted and “this appeal is DISMISSED.” (46922 Order Granting Motion to
Dismiss, dated Dec. 20, 2019, attached as Appendix D (capitalization original).)

3

Idaho Supreme Court number 46922-2019 is Marlow’s direct appeal. As explained in Esquivel
v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 233 P.3d 186 (Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added), “[e]xhibits, as well as
transcripts of the pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even
if previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial court in
the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part of the record on appeal unless presented to
the trial court as exhibits [citation omitted] or unless the trial court takes judicial notice of such
records from the criminal case.” In its Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary
Disposition, the district court took “judicial notice of this document and all other filings from case
no. CR-2017-19214 that are specifically referenced herein.” (Aug. R., p.3.) The court’s Order
referenced both the state’s motion to dismiss Marlow’s direct appeal and the order granting that
motion (id., p.4); therefore, those documents are part of the appellate record in this appeal.

9

2.

Post-Conviction Proceeding

Marlow’s Amended Petition claimed his trial counsel did not explain that the Offer
required him to waive his right to appeal his conviction, he did not otherwise know about such
waiver, and, had he been aware of the waiver provision, he could have rejected the Offer; it stated:
Trial Counsel’s failure to explain all of the terms of the plea agreement prevented
Mr. Marlow from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering into the plea
agreement. This prejudiced Mr. Marlow by allowing him to enter into a plea
agreement that waived all of his appellate rights.
. . . Had counsel performed in a reasonably effective fashion by fully explaining
the terms of the plea agreement there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Marlow
could have rejected the proposed agreement or at a minimum negotiated or sought
to enter a conditional plea in order to preserve certain appellate rights such as his
right to appeal the motion to dismiss or the denial of the request to continue the
trial.
(R., p.39.) In his supporting affidavit, Marlow averred: (1) during the May 18, 2018, pre-trial
conference, he met with his trial counsel to discuss the Offer, and at no time did counsel inform
him that the Offer “included a term that [he] was waiving [his] appellate rights[,] (2) the district
court did not inform him of such waiver, (3) “[a]t that time, [he] did not believe that [he] had
waived [his] appellate rights[,]” and (4) had he “known that a waiver of appellate rights was a term
of the plea agreement, [he] would not have plead guilty.” (R., pp.58-60.)
The state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, arguing: (1) Marlow presented no
evidence that he requested his trial counsel to “ensure he retain the ability to seek direct appeal[,]”
(2) Marlow failed to show that, despite his ability to read, write, and understand English, he
suffered any physical or mental condition that prevented him from understanding the plain
language of the Offer, (3) at the plea entry hearing, Marlow testified that he understood the Offer,
and (4) dispositive of the issue is that Marlow failed to present any admissible evidence, beyond
his own self-serving statement, to support his claim. (R., pp.67-68.)
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Marlow filed a Response which repeated the factual basis for his claim, emphasizing that
neither his trial counsel nor the trial court informed him that the Offer required him to waive his
appeal rights. (R., pp.221-223.) The state argued in its Reply that the bottom-line issue of
Marlow’s ineffectiveness claim – whether Marlow’s guilty pleas were entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily – was barred under principles of res judicata because the trial court
decided that issue in regard to his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and that decision was final.
(R., p.232.) The state also argued that the trial court’s compliance with the requirements of I.C.R.
11(c) provided “prima facie evidence of the knowing and voluntary nature” of Marlow’s pleas.
(R., p.233.) In a hearing on the state’s motion for summary disposition, the prosecutor repeated
the res judicata argument. (Tr., p.7, L.14 – p.8, L.10.)
After the hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal (see generally Tr., pp.3-19),
the district court entered an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition and
denied Marlow’s claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to advise Marlow
about the two waiver provisions (i.e., rights to appeal and to move to withdraw guilty pleas) in the
Offer, as follows:
In his brief, Marlow asserts that his attorney should have “presented the
deficiencies in the discussion of the offer on the record." Marlow does not specify
the alleged “deficiencies." If by "deficiencies” Marlow means the waivers of both
appeal and withdrawal of the guilty plea, those waivers had no practical effect on
Marlow’s rights because Marlow in fact exercised those rights, at least to a certain
extent, notwithstanding the waivers, as discussed further below. Moreover, the
Court discussed the plea agreement with Marlow, and Marlow told the Court that
he understood. Marlow has not shown that that there was a deficiency in his
understanding that had any detrimental effect on him. Marlow has not shown that
this allegation, if true, would have made any difference in the outcome.
(Aug. R., p.23 (emphases added).) Later in its Order the court explained, “[t]he inclusion of the
appeal and withdrawal of guilty plea waivers in the agreement had no practical effect on Marlow’s
subsequent exercise of those rights notwithstanding that agreement.” (Aug. R., p.35.)
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F.

Marlow Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Finding He Failed To Establish
A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That Counsel’s Performance Prejudiced Him
1.

The “Prejudice” Issue Is Barred By Principles Of Res Judicata

Even assuming that Marlow’s trial counsel failed to advise Marlow that the Offer required
him to waive his right to appeal from his convictions, and that such failure would be deficient
performance under Strickland, Marlow is precluded from claiming prejudice under the doctrine of
res judicata, as argued by the state below. (See R., p.232; Tr., p.7, L.14 – p.8, L.10.) Although
the district court did not rule on the state’s res judicata argument, this Court should affirm the
summary dismissal of Marlow’s claim on that correct theory. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162
Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“This doctrine is sometimes called the ‘right resultwrong theory’ rule.”); State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 694, 991 P.2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 1999)
(where a district court has reached a right result, that result will be affirmed on any correct theory).
As explained in Carter v. Gateway Parks, LLC, 168 Idaho 428, ___, 483 P.3d 971, 979
(2020), “Res judicata encompasses claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion, which
is also known as collateral estoppel.” To prove claim preclusion, “a litigant must show that the
current case and the previous case involve the same parties, the same claim, and the first case
ended in a final judgment.” Id. Claim preclusion “not only applies to the same claims previously
brought, but “also as to ‘every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.’”
Id., 168 Idaho at ___, 483 P.3d at 982 (quoting Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157
P.3d 613, 620 (2007) (quoting Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849
P.2d 107, 110 (1993))). The concept of claim preclusion is broad and it “‘may apply even where
there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the
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evidence relating to those theories.’” 4 Id., 483 P.3d at 981 (quoting Diamond v. Farmers Grp.,
Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990)). In State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9 n.1, 966
P.2d 1, 10 n.1 (1998), the Court explained, “when legal issues are decided in a criminal action on
direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in a
post-conviction relief proceeding.” See State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 703
(1988) (“Because the issues raised in the petition for post conviction relief were adjudicated on
direct appeal, [citation omitted], we find no error in the district court’s res judicata ruling.”)
Here, the first requirement for claim preclusion (“true res judicata”) is met because the
parties are the same as they were in the trial court proceeding. See Carter, 168 Idaho at ___, 483
P.3d at 979.
The second requirement, whether the claims are the same, is met because the current claim
merely adds an ineffective assistance of counsel layer on top of the claim Marlow raised in his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea – that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary because he did not know about the appeal waiver provision of the Offer. The trial court
ruled that, despite Marlow’s claim of ignorance about the appeal waiver provision – and without
regard to trial counsel’s conduct – his guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (R.,
p.171-72 (2/15/19 Tr., p.89, L.4 – p.90, L.22.) The trial court’s ruling was totally divorced from
trial counsel’s conduct, stating: “When one looks at the pretrial settlement offer that was signed

4

Somewhat similarly, to present a successful “issue preclusion” claim, a litigant must show “(1)
the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the
issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in
the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.”
Carter, 168 Idaho at ___, 483 P.3d at 983 (quoting Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618).
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by everybody back on May 18th and looks at the record that was made when the plea was entered,
the Court finds that there was a knowing and voluntarily and intelligently-entered guilty plea, so
the Court accepted the plea[.]” (R., p.172 (2/15/19 Tr., p.90, Ls.16-21).)
Marlow cannot challenge that finding now by alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him about the waiver. See Carter, 168 Idaho at ___, 483 P.3d at 982 (citations to
quote chain of cases omitted) (The res judicata concept is “broad” and “‘may apply even where
there is not a substantial overlap between the theories advanced in support of a claim, or in the
evidence relating to those theories.’”). For the purposes of employing res judicata, the claim raised
by Marlow and decided by the trial court is the “same claim” he presented in his post-conviction
proceeding.
The third res judicata requirement is met because the first case ended in a final judgment. 5
The Idaho Supreme Court entered its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss on December 20, 2019,
and the Remittitur was issued January 12, 2020. (Appendix D; see iCourt Portal for Kootenai
County Case No. CR-2017-19214 (showing date of Remittitur).) Marlow cannot change the fact
that the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim has been extinguished by the
trial court’s now-final ruling that, despite his claim of ignorance about the appeal waiver provision
in the Offer, and apart from any advice his trial counsel may (or may not) have provided, his guilty
pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Instead of directly arguing that the ruling made by the trial court is not final, Marlow asserts
that “dismissal of the [direct] appeal does not act as a waiver of his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim because he was not able to litigate the validity of the waiver on appeal because it required

5

See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (“[J]udgment becomes final,
either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal.”)
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the presentation of evidence outside the record[,]” and “[s]ince he could not challenge the waiver
on appeal, he may do so now” in this post-conviction proceeding. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)
Marlow’s argument is flawed in a couple of ways.
Marlow has not previously argued in his response to the state’s invocation of his appeal
waiver in his direct appeal or in the post-conviction proceeding below, that current Idaho law –
namely, McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 296-297, 396 P.3d 1168, 1178-1179 (2017) – directing
that challenges to appeal waivers be made on direct appeal, is incorrect or inapplicable. “[B]oth
the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be
properly preserved for appeal.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).
Therefore, Marlow’s argument that a post-conviction proceeding is the proper forum for
challenging the validity of his appeal waiver (because it relies on information outside the record)
cannot be considered because it has not been preserved for appeal.
Even if the issue is considered, the Idaho Supreme Court has prescribed the following
procedure for challenging an appeal waiver:
If a defendant files an appeal and has waived the right to appeal the only
issue(s) that the defendant seeks to raise on appeal, and that fact is brought to our
attention before oral argument, we will issue an order conditionally dismissing the
appeal in order to give the defendant an opportunity to show good cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed. If the defendant cannot do so, we will dismiss the
appeal. . . .
If the defendant has challenged the validity of the waiver of the right to
appeal, we will address that issue and, if it is decided against the defendant, we will
dismiss the appeal without addressing the other issue(s).
McKinney, 162 Idaho at 296, 396 P.3d at 1178. In sum, McKinney determined that the acceptable
forum for challenging an appeal waiver is the direct appeal, where the challenger must show “good
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.” Id.
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In State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 476, 472 P.3d 576, 581 (2020), the Idaho Supreme Court
reiterated the procedure set out in McKinney for challenges to appeal waivers, noting that federal
circuit courts similarly hold that the state must first invoke application of an appeal waiver, then
allow the defendant an opportunity to respond. In Haws, where the state did not invoke the appeal
waiver until it filed its response brief, the Court explained:
Finally, this Court has recognized that a defendant should have the
opportunity to respond to the State's invocation of an appellate waiver, whether it
is through a brief following a conditional dismissal of the appeal or in the reply
brief. See McKinney, 162 Idaho at 296, 396 P.3d at 1178. In other words, while an
appeal may be subject to dismissal based on an appellate waiver, the State is the
party who must invoke the application of the waiver, and the defendant must be
afforded an opportunity to respond. See id.
We want to emphasize that the better and preferred practice would be for the State
to file a motion to dismiss the appeal rather than invoke the appellate waiver in its
response brief. It was noted during oral argument that the State was not aware of
the appellate waiver until after the briefing had been scheduled. However, the State
could have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and sought to stay the briefing. This
would be the preferred procedure.
We conclude Haws should be afforded the opportunity to respond to the State's
appellate waiver arguments in his reply brief; as a result, given the procedural
posture of this case, the issue has not been forfeited by Haws because he did not
address this issue in his initial brief.[6]
Haws, 167 Idaho at 475, 472 P.3d at 580 (emphasis added).
Pursuant to McKinney and Haws, the state followed the “better and preferred practice” of
filing a motion to dismiss Marlow’s direct appeal, giving him the opportunity to establish good

6

Haws addressed “the validity of his appellate waiver in his reply brief after the state asserted the
appeal waiver in its response brief.” Haws, 167 Idaho at 474-475, 472 P.3d at 579-580. Haws
also held that a “misstatement by the district court that Haws had reserved his right to appeal his
sentence, in direct conflict with the written plea waiver,” did not demonstrate that he did not
understand he was waiving his appellate rights. 167 Idaho at 477, 472 P.3d at 582. Unlike here,
the plea colloquy in Haws established that Haws read and signed the plea agreement, and agreed
to “all the terms contained therein.” 167 Idaho at 479, 472 P.3d at 584.
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cause for why his direct appeal should not be dismissed, and he simply chose not to do so. (See
Appendices A, B.) Marlow did not assert error in the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea as a ground for allowing him to pursue the appeal. 7 The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed
Marlow’s direct appeal as a result. (Appendices C, D. 8) The trial court’s rejection of Marlow’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and its rejection of Marlow’s claim of ignorance of the appeal
waiver in the plea agreement, are final.
Nor has Marlow been prevented from challenging the validity of his appeal waiver, based
on his trial counsel’s performance, in this post-conviction proceeding. (See R., pp.50-51; see
generally Appellant’s brief, p.16 (“Since he could not challenge the waiver on appeal, he may do
so now.”).) That Marlow may now be barred by res judicata principles from asserting one element
(i.e., prejudice) required to prove his ineffectiveness claim does not mean he has been denied the
opportunity to challenge his appeal waiver in this post-conviction proceeding. Had the trial court
not ruled that Marlow’s guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, Marlow would have
had a clear path to pursue the prejudice prong of Strickland without regard to the res judicata bar.
Marlow has not been precluded from presenting his ineffective assistance claim in this postconviction proceeding; instead, he has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact that his

7

Marlow notes that ineffective assistance of counsel claims relying on evidence outside the trial
court record must be pursued in a post-conviction relief action. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)
Importantly in this case, Marlow was given the chance to present evidence in support of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea in the criminal case, and testified that he was ignorant of the appeal
waiver provision in the plea agreement. It is the district court’s rejection of that testimony and the
factual underpinnings of that motion that results in res judicata in this case. (See R., p.171-72
(2/15/19 Tr., p.89, L.19 – p.90, L.22.)
8

Marlow’s argument complicates several matters McKinney resolved, such as requiring the state
to invoke an appeal waiver before oral argument occurs in the direct appeal, and its implicit finding
that it is necessary to decide the validity of an appeal waiver in the initial phase of a direct appeal
in order to avoid devoting time and resources to deciding issues in a direct appeal that a postconviction court may later find has been validly waived.
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trial counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice due to the res judicata effect of the trial court’s
prior ruling.
All three requirements for applying res judicata have been met. Marlow cannot establish
prejudice under Strickland and Hill because the trial court rejected his assertion that he did not
know about the appeal waiver, “find[ing] that there was a knowing and voluntarily and
intelligently-entered guilty plea[.]” (R., p.172 (2/15/19 Tr., p.90, Ls.16-21 (emphasis added).)
Because the district court found Marlow knew about the plea waiver provision from the plea
waiver document itself, whether Marlow’s trial attorney informed him of the appeal waiver
provision is irrelevant.
2. Marlow Failed To Show That Rejection Of The Offer Would Have Been Rational
Under The Circumstances
The summary dismissal of Marlow’s claim that his trial counsel failed to advise him about
the appeal waiver provision in the Offer should be affirmed by this Court because Marlow failed
to present any evidence to show that, absent counsel’s alleged deficient performance, a decision
to reject the plea offer would have been “rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (Prejudice is
presumed “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an
appeal that he otherwise would have taken.”)
In its Answer, the state contended that Marlow’s Amended Petition should be dismissed
on its merits because it “contain[ed] bare and conclusory allegations unsupported by otherwise
verifiable affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fail[ed] to raise any
genuine issue of material fact.” (R., p.45.) Specific to Marlow’s appeal waiver claim, the state’s
Motion for Summary Disposition stated, “dispositive of this issue is that Petitioner has presented
no evidence, beyond his own self-serving testimony, to support his claim(s).” (R., p.68.) The
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motion further explained that Marlow failed to meet his burden of proving the claim because it
was not supported with affidavits “based on admissible, otherwise verifiable information[,]” and
repeated that “‘[b]are or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to
entitle an applicant to an evidentiary hearing.’” (R., p.68 (quoting Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494,
497, 887 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 1994)).)
Marlow had the “burden of showing how trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance
caused prejudice.” Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 611, 181 P.3d 533, 537 (Ct. App. 2008). When
the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in relation to a guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the
‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). “Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
470 (2000)).
The most Marlow has said in his petitions and affidavits about being prejudiced by his trial
counsel’s alleged failure to advise him about the appeal waiver provision is that, absent counsel’s
failure, he would not have entered his pleas of guilt. (See R., pp.6-13 (Pet. and Aff. for Post Conv.
Relief), 18-19 (Aff. of Facts in Support), 39-41 (Am. Pet. filed 7/1/20), 51-53 (Am. Pet. filed
7/7/20), 60 (Aff. of Marlow).) Nowhere did Marlow explain how “a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational” if his trial counsel had not failed to advise him of the appeal
waiver provision, as required by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. Therefore, even though the district court
summarily dismissed Marlow’s claim on different grounds, its decision should be affirmed on this
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correct basis also. See Mireles, 133 Idaho at 694, 991 P.2d at 882 (a right result will be affirmed
on any correct theory).
3.

Marlow Failed To Show He Lacked Knowledge Of The Appeal Waiver Provision

In summarily dismissing Marlow’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to advise him that the Offer required him to waive his right to appeal from his convictions, the
district court held that he “has not shown that that there was a deficiency in his understanding that
had any detrimental effect on him.” (Aug. R., p.23.) To the extent the court’s statement indicates
that Marlow failed to show any deficiency in his understanding of the Offer, the court was correct.
Even if it does not, the court’s summary dismissal of the claim should nonetheless be upheld on
that alternative ground. 9 See Mireles, 133 Idaho at 694, 991 P.2d at 882.
At the beginning of the plea entry hearing, the prosecutor notified the trial court that he had
made a “Pretrial Settlement offer today[,]” but did not know if it was going to be accepted. (R.,
p.79 (5/1818 Tr., p.2, Ls.10-12).) Marlow’s trial counsel responded, saying he was looking at the
Settlement Offer “right now[,]” and “[m]y client and I have been discussing it.” (R., p.79 (5/18/18
Tr., p.2, Ls.16-19) (emphasis added).) Before accepting Marlow’s pleas, the trial court complied

9

The prejudice requirement of Strickland is not based on whether Marlow filed a direct appeal
after he pled guilty. Instead, he must show that, absent trial counsel’s deficient conduct, he would
not have pled guilty, Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, and he “must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances,” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372
(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
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with the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), 10 which the Idaho Supreme Court deems as prima facie
evidence of the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea. State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95, 90 P.3d
314, 320 (2004) (“if the record indicates that the trial court followed the requirements of Rule
11(c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is voluntary and knowing”); (see R., pp.80-81
(5/18/18 Tr., p.7, L.9 – p.12, L.25)).
Marlow’s petitions and affidavits do not repeat the testimony he presented in the hearing
on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, in which he said, “I did not know of [the appeal waiver]
because I have a hard time reading without glasses and I was not aware that I was not able to appeal
it … or else I would not have signed the deal.” (R., p.157-58 (5/18/18 Tr., p.75, L.24 – p.76, L.13);
see R., p.159 (5/18/18 Tr., p.77, Ls.2-15).) Marlow’s post-conviction petitions and affidavits say
nothing about his inability or failure to read the Offer sheet. (See pp.6-13 (Pet. and Aff. for Post
Conv. Relief), 18-19 (Aff. of Facts in Support), 39-41 (Am. Pet. filed 7/1/20), 51-53 (Am. Pet.
filed 7/7/20), 60 (Aff. of Marlow).) Instead, Marlow implies that he did not read the Offer sheet
by stating that he did not know about its appeal waiver provision. (See R., pp.51 (“Trial Counsel’s
failure to explain all of the terms of the plea agreement prevented Mr. Marlow from knowingly,

10

Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) states that, before a guilty plea is accepted , the record (with
reasonable inferences, must show:
(1) the voluntariness of the plea;
(2) that the defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including
minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences that may apply;
(3) that the defendant was advised that, by pleading guilty, the defendant would
waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to confront witnesses against the defendant;
(4) that the defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against the
defendant; and
(5) whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is
a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and
that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or
recommendation from either party as to punishment.
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intelligently, and voluntarily entering into the plea agreement.”), 59-60 (“Had I known that a
waiver of appellate rights was a term of the plea agreement, I would not have plead guilty.”).)
Marlow’s implicit denial that he read the Offer sheet does not suffice to overcome the summary
dismissal of his claim.
The Offer sheet reads in relevant part, “The State offers that in exchange for Defendant’s
guilty plea(s) to: [second degree kidnapping and robbery] “and Defendant’s agreement to:
Waive appeal as of right as to conviction and ability to request a withdrawal of guilty plea under
I.C.R. 34. … It will agree and recommend as follows: [a Rule 11(f) agreement and a sentence
of 20 years, with eight years fixed, and Marlow is free to argue for less].” (R., p.78 (bold original);
see Appendix A.) The waiver sentence conspicuously appears in the middle of the one-page
document, surrounded by double spacing, and is immediately preceded by a box that is checked.
At the bottom of the Offer is another box that is checked, followed by the statement “I ACCEPT
THE ABOVE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT OFFER AND WAIVE THE FOLLOWING
RIGHTS” and a list of five basic rights. (Id. (bold and capitalization original).) The bottom of
the Offer sheet is signed and dated by both Marlow and his trial counsel. (Id.)
The fact that Marlow signed the Offer sheet, which clearly required him to waive his right
to appeal his convictions, is determinative here. In State v. Haws, 167 Idaho 471, 475, 472 P.3d
576, 580 (2020), the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
“Plea agreements are essentially bilateral contracts between the prosecutor
and the defendant.” McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 296, 396 P.3d 1168, 1178
(2017) (quoting State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 524, 300 P.3d 53, 56 (2013)).
Therefore, this Court reviews plea agreements using general contract principles.
State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citation omitted).
“The interpretation of a contract’s meaning and legal effect are questions of law to
be decided by the Court if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous.”
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 63, 106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004) (quotation omitted).
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See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 744 (2019) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
137 (2009) (“That an appeal waiver does not bar claims outside its scope follows from the fact
that, ‘[a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts.’”).
“The rule in Idaho is well established that a party's failure to read a contract will not excuse
his performance.” Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 811,186 P.3d 663, 667 (2008) (quoting Irwin
Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 273, 833 P.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1992)).
Moreover, “[t]he voluntary failure to read a contract does not excuse a party's performance.”
Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007) (citing Belk v.
Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 39 P.3d 592 (2001)). Marlow’s insinuation that he did not read the Offer
sheet cannot be used in any way to excuse his performance of his signed plea agreement –
including to show prejudice under Strickland.
Marlow’s claim that he did not know the Offer sheet included an appeal waiver is belied
by the record. His trial counsel informed the court that he and Marlow had been discussing the
Offer sheet, the plea colloquy conformed with I.C.R. 11(c) and is prima facie proof that the pleas
were voluntary, and, most importantly, Marlow signed and dated the Offer sheet, which became a
contractual agreement between the parties which Marlow cannot evade by merely claiming he did
not read it. See Allen, 145 Idaho at 811,186 P.3d at 667; Swanson, 145 Idaho at 63, 175 P.3d at
752.
Because Marlow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the prejudice
requirement of Strickland and Hill, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing his claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Marlow’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2021.
/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File
and Serve:
DENNIS BENJAMIN
NEVIN, BENJAMIN & McKAY LLP
db@nbmlaw.com

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
V.
)
)
BRANDON CODY MARLOW,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________ )
STATE OF IDAHO,

Supreme Court No. 46922-2019
Kootenai Co. Case No.
CR-2017-19214

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

The State ofldaho moves this Court to dismiss this appeal with prejudice. See I.AR. 32(b).
This Court should dismiss this appeal because Mr. Marlow agreed to "[w]aive appeal as of right
as to conviction" when he signed his plea agreement. (R., p.248.) This Court will enforce a
defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal. See McKinney v.
State, 162 Idaho 286, 296-97, 396 P.3d 1168, 1178-79 (2017). "If a defendant files an appeal and
has waived the right to appeal the only issue(s) that the defendant seeks to raise on appeal, and that
fact is brought to [this Court's] attention before oral argument, [this Comi] will issue an order
conditionally dismissing the appeal in order to give the defendant an opportunity to show good

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF-PAGE 1

r

cause why the appeal should not be dismissed." Id. at 296, 396 P.3d at 1178. "If the defendant
cannot do so, [this Court] will dismiss the appeal." Id.
Mr. Marlow's plea agreement waived his right to appeal the only issues that he raised in
his opening brief. His opening brief alleges that the district court erred when it (1) denied his
1
motion to dismiss the case and (2) denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's

brief, pp.12-30.) But he waived his right to appeal either of those issues in his plea agreement:
"Defendant[] agree[ s] to ... [w ]aive appeal as of right as to conviction and ability to request a
withdrawal of guilty plea." (R., p.248.)
While a waiver does not preclude this Court from addressing an appellant's challenge to
"the validity of the waiver of the right to appeal," McKinney, 162 Idaho at 296, 396 P.3d at 1178,
Mr. Marlow has not challenged the validity of his waiver on appeal (see Appellant's brief, pp.1230). And he cannot raise that as an issue on appeal now because he did not raise it in his opening
brief. See Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) ("We will not
consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief.").
Because Mr. Marlow has not challenged the validity of his waiver and the only issues he raised in
his opening brief fall squarely within the scope of his waiver, the state seeks dismissal of this
waived appeal.
Opposing counsel has not been contacted regarding this Motion.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2019.

JEF
Deputy Attorney General
1

While Mr. Marlow technically listed three issues in his opening brief (Appellant's brief, p.11 ),
one of those issues is his challenge to an evidentiary ruling made in the context of his motion to
dismiss and is, for purposes of the waiver, a waived attack on his underlying conviction (R., p.248).
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF - PAGE 2

F

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of November, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STATEMENT IN
SUPPORT THEREOF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt File and Serve:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id. us

JE{j/if¥
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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STATE OF IDAHO

OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
Defending Zealously, Advancing Fairness, and Advocating with Integrity.

December 2, 2019

Ms. Karel Lehrman
Clerk of the Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
RE:

State v. Marlow, No. 46922-2019
Kootenai County No. CR-2017-19214

Dear Ms. Lehrman:
I am in receipt of the State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Statement in Support
Thereof, filed November 18, 2019. According to the United States Supreme Court, the State
must invoke an appeal waiver for it to apply. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744-45 (2019)
("[A] waived appellate claim can still go forward if the prosecution forfeits or waives the
waiver."). Thus, I do not intend to file any further response to the Motion to Dismiss Appeal in
this case.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
BPM/tmv
cc:

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

~SCMNED
State Appellate Public Defender
322 East Front Street, Suite 570
Boise. ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 334-2712 Fax: (208)334-2985
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APPENDIX D

RECEIVED
DEC 20 2019
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

Supreme Court Docket No. 46922-2019
Kootenai County District Court No.
CR-2017-19214

V.

BRANDON CODY MARLOW,
Defendant-A

ellant.

A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF was
filed by counsel for Respondent on November 18, 2019, requesting this Court dismiss this
appeal because Appellant agreed to "[w]aive appeal as of right as to conviction" when the plea
agreement was signed. A LETTER was filed by counsel for Appellant on December 2, 2019.
The Court is fully advised, therefore; after due consideration,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL be, and is
hereby, GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.
Dated December _lQ_, 2019.

zer
Kar~LfrMf)
of the Supreme Court

Clerk of the Courts

cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - Docket No. 46922-2019

NED

